A recent innovation in equity markets is the introduction of market maker services paid for by the listed companies themselves. We investigate what motivates the issuing rms to pay a cost to improve the secondary market liquidity of their listed shares. By studying the timing of market maker hirings relative to corporate events we show that a contributing factor in this decision is the likelihood that the rm will interact with the capital markets in the near future. The typical rm employing a designated market maker is more likely to raise capital, repurchase shares or experience an exit by insiders.
The world's equity markets are changing rapidly. Over the last decade trading has become increasingly fragmented, due to the entry of new trading venues, oering erce competition to the traditional listing exchanges. These new trading venues oer both high speed (low latency) market access and very low transaction fees. Another signicant development is the high fraction of order and trading volume due to algorithmic trading, combined with the gradual disappearance of market participants with positive obligations to provide liquidity. The passing of the NYSE specialist in 2008 is the most visible example, 1 but this has been a global trend, as more and more markets have moved to fully electronic limit order books.
It is commonly argued that we do not need the traditional market makers in today's markets because a large proportion of liquidity supply is provided by High Frequency Traders (HFTs), a subset of algorithmic traders, who act as market makers. The HFTs rapidly update their limit orders and maintain a continuous bid ask spread, a spread much tighter and presumably at more ecient prices than could be achieved under the old specialist system. However, there are also concerns about these \new market makers." While some High Frequency Traders are clearly specialized in providing liquidity and earning the bid/ask spread (see e.g. Menkveld (2013) ), it is not clear that these traders will continue to do so in times of market stress. A well known example is the US \ash crash" where the results in e.g. Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2011) suggest that, while the HFTs initially were supplying liquidity, they eventually became net consumers of liquidity and contributed to the crash.
One response to the ash crash has been to question the utility of continuous trading with nanosecond precision. A political response has been to call for a transaction tax or the 1 The specialists at the NYSE were in October 2008 transformed into Designated Market Makers (DMM), see www.nyse.com/pdfs/fact_sheet_dmm.pdf. Note, however, that an important distinction between the DMMs studied in this paper and the NYSE DMMs is that there is no payment from the rms for the market making services provided by the DMMs at the NYSE. Instead the NYSE DMMs receive benets such as being entitled to parity with incoming orders (as opposed to the old specialists' obligation to yield to public orders) and other benets that result in better access to capital and risk management tools which make their operations more cost eective. In addition to the NYSE Designated Market Makers, two other important liquidity providers are Trading Floor Brokers and Supplemental Liquidity Providers (SLPs).
introduction of other frictions to slow down the trading process (e.g. a minimum resting period for limit orders and other delays). Financial economists on the other hand typically ask whether it is possible to change the trading mechanism to level the playing eld. An often mentioned example of such a mechanism is to replace continuous trading with frequent call auctions. Most market participants, such as the exchanges, would however prefer to stay within the continuous trading paradigm, but are looking into dierent ways of introducing agents with positive market maker obligations into the electronic limit order book structure.
The markets that introduced continuous limit order markets in the 1980s and 1990s, such as most of the European exchanges, faced this problem of \no positive liquidity provision" earlier than the US. Their response was the introduction of what is called a Designated Market Maker (DMM) . This is a market participant who provides liquidity by continuously maintaining bid and ask quotes in the electronic limit order book. The novel feature of the way this is implemented in these markets is that the issuing rms pay the cost of this liquidity provision. In addition to listing fees paid to the exchange, listed rms enter into separate contracts where they pay nancial intermediaries to provide a \liquidity service" for their stocks.
The viability of this type arrangement is analyzed theoretically by Bessembinder, Hao, and Zheng (2012) (BHZ) . They conclude that \The DMM contract increases trading volume, and enhances allocative eciency, price discovery and rm value." The starting point of their analysis is an IPO, where a rm is considering listing on an exchange. In an IPO, the value of the rm increases with the issue price. Ellul and Pagano (2006) show both theoretically and empirically that IPO underpricing is lower (IPO price is higher) if the after-issue stock is more liquid. Thus, if the rm can guarantee that a stock will be more liquid down the road, they can support a higher IPO price. BHZ shows the feasibility of an equilibrium where the rm hires a DMM to support the after-listing liquidity against a fee. This allows the rm to charge a higher price in their IPO.
The BHZ model specically discusses IPO situations, but it clearly generalizes to other cases where the liquidity of the company's stock aects the terms in corporate actions. In such cases rms may want to improve liquidity before the corporate actions. Our paper is an investigation of this potential link between corporate actions and the rm's decision to hire a DMM. While earlier research has investigated the eect on liquidity and trading costs of corporate hires of Designated Market Makers, 2 less attention has been paid to the corporate motivations for rms to pay this out-of-pocket cost. In our work we concentrate on this issue by studying a sample of Norwegian rms that hire or terminate a DMM arrangement. We consider various corporate actions whose terms may be aected by market liquidity, and test if the likelihood of such actions aects the rm's decision to hire a DMM.
We investigate three possible corporate actions; Seasoned Equity Oers (SEOs), Open Market Stock Repurchases and Exchange Listings (IPOs). Our main nding is that all of these actions are linked to the use of DMMs. Firms in need of new capital, and therefore planning on raising new capital through a SEO, are more likely to hire a DMM. Similarly, rms planning to perform open market repurchases are more likely to hire a DMM. In addition, rms that hire a DMM are more likely to experience an exit by insiders. When modeling the decision to terminate a DMM arrangement, we nd that the main determinant of continuing a DMM arrangement is whether the rm continues to repurchase shares or not. Firms that continue to repurchase have a signicantly lower probability of terminating their DMM contract.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We rst give a short discussion of the relevant theory and hypothesis tested in the paper, before, in Section 2, discussing the data and providing some descriptive statistics for the DMM contracts at the Oslo Stock Exchange. In Section 3 we show what happens to the stock around the DMM hiring, before, in Section 4, examining the main research question of the paper; when do issuers choose to hire (or re) a DMM? Section 5 oers a brief conclusion.
Theory
In this section we will discuss the theoretical background of the decision we are evaluating; corporate hirings of DMMs. To motivate our main hypothesis it is useful to start by thinking about the market for DMM services as having a supply side and a demand side.
The supply side concerns the nancial intermediary oering the DMM services. This intermediary can vary the fee it charges for the service from the rm, and the terms of the contract, such as the minimum spread and the minimum quantity. Such a contract may require the DMM to keep the minimum spread to a contractual number of e.g. four percent. The way the DMM would implement this is to maintain bid and ask quotes by submitting and updating limit orders to buy and sell, with a maximal price dierence of four percent relative to the bid/ask midpoint. Theoretically, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) show that the equilibrium competitive spread will align a liquidity providers' expected loss to informed traders with the expected gain from uninformed traders, such that the liquidity provider breaks even. Any spread lower than the competitive spread would result in an expected loss for the liquidity providers. For a DMM to be willing to keep the spread below the competitive spread, the spread that would naturally arise with competitive market making, the DMM will need a subsidy that covers the DMM's expected loss from trades with informed traders in excess of what the DMM will earn from the spread when trading with uninformed traders. In the DMM contracts we will be studying, this subsidy is paid for by the rm.
The tighter the contractual spread, the less the DMM can be expected to earn from the spread, particularly with lots of trading, since the DMM will have to compete with many other limit order submitters to be rst in the queue and on both sides of the trades. But as the competitive spread gets wider and trading activity decreases, the DMM may expect to be on both sides of a considerable fraction of the trades at the lower (than competitive) contractual spread at which he will be supplying liquidity. On the other hand, at this lower spread the DMM is also facing a higher risk of being picked o by informed traders. There is also the issue of trading frequency. The presence of a DMM may also increase the frequency of trading. If so, the DMM's revenue from earning the spread will increase. The contracted liquidity level may actually become \self-sustaining" with a sucient amount of new trading interest in the stock.
We therefore think of the DMM as oering a menu of prices and contractual terms. It is likely that the fee the DMM requires for the service will be related both to the absolute level of the contractual spread and the implied spread improvement relative to the current level of the spread. When setting the menu, the DMM will also have to form expectations about any changes in trade frequency as a result of the improved liquidity.
The demand side is the rm which has issued the stock. The rm needs to trade o the oered price(s) it will be paying to the intermediary against the perceived benets to the rm of the improved liquidity in the secondary markets. The argument used in the theoretical model of BHZ is that the terms of corporate actions are aected by secondary market liquidity of the company's stock. There are various corporate actions for which liquidity may matter.
First, we have the case used directly in the BHZ model: listings (IPOs). A rm may precommit to having a DMM to ensure the market liquidity of the issued shares for a time after the IPO. It is also shown both theoretically and empirically by Ellul and Pagano (2006) that rms with higher ex post stock market liquidity have lower underpricing in the IPO (i.e. higher price).
This type of argument carries over to the second type of corporate actions we consider: issues of new equity (Seasoned Equity Oers -SEOs). SEOs may be aected by liquidity either through the probability of actually getting capital, or the price at which capital is raised, i.e. underpricing of the issue. If we look at underpricing, there is international empirical evidence that liquidity aects the underpricing in a SEO (Ginglinger, Matsoukis, and Riva, 2013; Stulz, Vagias, and van Dijk, 2012) . The presence of a DMM may therefore result in better terms (less underpricing) in the SEO. If we alternatively look at the probability of raising the desired equity, there is empirical evidence that higher liquidity in the stock allows for more equity in the capital structure, see e.g. Lipson and Mortal (2009) .
The third corporate action we investigate is share repurchases. Here the BHZ argument does not carry over as readily, due to the competing theories of corporate motivations for repurchases. We refer to Vermaelen (2005) for a survey of the repurchase literature, and instead try to contrast the best known arguments. The typical argument for repurchases is that they are cost eective ways of distributing free cash to the rm's owners, potentially catering to dierent clienteles. The clienteles may for example be tax-induced. For such a motivation for repurchases, clearly the rm wants the liquidity to be as good as possible, because it lowers trading costs when repurchasing. There is however an alternative theory of repurchases, that rms strategically repurchase stock when it is underpriced. In such cases, the rm is presumably acting in the interests of its long-term owners. With such a motivation for repurchases, the rm would not want to hire a DMM, because improved liquidity also entails better price discovery. A more liquid and actively traded stock is less likely to be underpriced.
For all these corporate actions, the issuing rm will evaluate the current liquidity level that the rm's stock is trading at and ask whether the costs of having a DMM is outweighed by the potential improvements in the terms of corporate actions. Clearly, for the most liquid rms on the exchange, there is no need to pay anything for liquidity improvement, liquidity is good enough anyway. But as the current liquidity level gets larger, the benets of paying the cost may start outweighing the costs and hiring a DMM is a feasible option. For the least liquid shares, however, the costs will be too large for the rms to pay. Such reasoning would argue for a nonlinear relationship between the current level of liquidity and the likelihood of using a DMM. 3 One thing the theory so far is silent on is dynamics. As time passes, most rms' circumstances change. This can come from the dynamics in the rm's product markets, or more generally, market-wide shocks such as nancial crises. In our work we will look at the decision to hire a DMM as one that is continually updated to reect changing circumstances. The horizon at which one evaluates these circumstances will vary. First, at the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) the DMM contract is valid for at least one quarter, with a xed fee up front. The nancial markets know this pre-commitment. However, from the perspective of a longer term investor participating in the SEO, there is an question of whether the promised improvement in liquidity from hiring a DMM after e.g. a SEO is a credible commitment. In other words, what guarantee does the investors have that the DMM will be kept for longer than the minimum 3 month period after the SEO? While there are no explicit commitment from the rm to keep the DMM going after a corporate action, there are potential reputation costs associated with discontinuing the DMM just after capital has been raised. For most rms, raising capital or conducting repurchases is not a one shot event, but rather a recurring activity. Thus, for a rm that is likely to also interact with the capital markets in the future, it would be important to keep the DMM long enough after the SEO to be able to use a DMM to improve terms also in future corporate actions. Later in the analysis we examine the typical length of DMM arrangements and document that most DMM arrangements lasts signicantly longer than the minimum possible commitment of 3 months. This also relates to the investment horizon for equity owners. Using evidence from , the median holding period for an equity owner at the Oslo Stock Exchange is less than half a year. Financial market participants will typically have shorter horizons than the rm's investments, which for example in the oil industry may be commitments for several decades.
follows from arguments in BHZ. In their model, what is driving the demand for DMMs is the relative degreee of informational asymmetry relevant for setting the spread. An implication is then that the rms with the least liquid stocks will not have a DMM because the inventory costs will dominate any informational asymmetries.
Institutional details and descriptive statistics
Our sample consists of stocks listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) in Norway. The OSE is a medium-sized stock exchange by European standards, and has stayed relatively independent. 4 The current trading structure is an electronic limit order book, where orders always need to specify a price and are subject to a strict price-time priority rule. To illustrate the evolution of market liquidity at the OSE over the period 2000-2012, Figure 1 shows the time series of the relative (closing) bid/ask spreads for the whole market and for stocks grouped by size. Spreads at the OSE gradually decreased in the 1990s and early 2000s, until in 2004 they reached their lowest level. Spreads increased markedly during the 2008 nancial crisis, and have not yet come back to that historical low. The spreads for groups of stocks with dierent market capitalization show clear dierences in liquidity. The largest stocks on the OSE are very liquid with relative spreads below 1%, spreads which seems largely unaected by the nancial crisis, while the smaller stocks have had spreads in the 3-7% range, with a clear worsening of liquidity during the crisis.
In 2004 the OSE introduced the possibility for nancial intermediaries to declare themselves as Designated Market Makers (DMMs) in a rm's stock, where the rm pays the DMM for the market making service. Formally, the exchange is not a legal party in the contract, which is an agreement directly between the issuing rm and a nancial intermediary. The exchange is merely informed that a contract has been established. The presence of a DMM is used by the exchange in grouping the stocks on the exchange into a liquid and illiquid segment. The most liquid stocks, and/or those with a DMM, are included in the OB Match index. The less liquid (remaining) stocks are assigned to the OB Standard index. 5 The design of the contract is such that the DMM contracts to maintain a specied maximal spread \most of the time." The two parties have leeway along several dimensions. The OSE provides a standardized contract, where the DMM and the issuer agree on a percentage of the trading day that the bid and ask quotes should be available, a minimum volume that should be available at the bid and ask quotes, and nally a maximum level of the bid/ask spread, typically specied as a percentage relative spread. The parties may add other contractual features. These exact features are not made public, all the parties need to announce is that a DMM has been assigned to a stock, and when it will start operating. 6 When a DMM contract is entered into the rst time, it needs to be announced through the 4 See Bhren and degaard (2001) , Ns, Skjeltorp, and degaard (2008) and Ns, Skjeltorp, and degaard (2009) for some discussion of the structure of the exchange and descriptive statistics for trading at the OSE.
5 The exchange will typically receive a copy of the contract, but this is privileged information, only used by the surveillance department at the exchange to track DMM activity in these stocks, ensuring that the DMMs are fullling their obligations in accordance with the contract. 6 We do unfortunately not have access to the actual contracts, but have been told by stock exchange ocials that the \typical" contract has a requirement of bid/ask quotes being available 85% of the trading day, a maximum relative spread requirement of 4% and a minimum lot size of the best bid and ask of 4, which typically amount to 400 shares. ocial notice board of the exchange. To generate the sample of DMM contracts, we have collected all announcements of new DMM contracts from the OSE. In most cases discontinuations will also be announced, but not always. We have therefore used some additional information to identify discontinuations, such as movements from the most liquid OSE index to the least liquid. Any rms in this least liquid index will not have a DMM. While we believe we have caught most discontinuations, the timing of the discontinuations are less certain than the rst hires. 7 In addition to the announcements, we use additional data from the OSE data services, which provides daily price quotes, announcements, accounting data, etc. Table 1 shows some details about the introduction of DMMs at the OSE. For each year we list the number of new DMM deals, the total number of stocks with active DMMs and the fraction (in percent) of listed stocks with a DMM. The number of DMM contracts is small relative to the total number of listed rms. At the most (in 2010) there were 58 rms with a DMM, which was 22% of the rms listed on the exchange. The rms with DMMs are typically smaller, as can be seen from the split into four size quartiles. In total over the sample period, we observe 143 cases where rms hire DMMs, but some of these are cases where the same rm switches DMM or rehires a DMM after a pause. Panel B of Table 1 shows the industry distribution of rms with a DMM. 8 The industry distribution is typical for the OSE, with many rms in the Energy and Industry categories, which typically are oil-related rms. Table 2 provides various summary statistics comparing rms with a DMM in a given year to rms that do not have a DMM in the same year (other). 9 The rst set of statistics measure rm magnitude, using both asset values and accounting gures. We also look at measures that capture rm health (sales growth and Q). The typical rm that has an ongoing DMM agreement is smaller than the average OSE rm. This is particularly apparent when looking at the averages. However, the averages are pushed up by a very skewed size distribution at the OSE, where the largest three rms constitute between 35% and 50% of the total market capitalization of the OSE in the 2005-2011 period. It is therefore more informative to focus on the medians, which conrm that the rms with DMMs are among the smaller ones on the exchange. Tobin's Q for the rms with DMMs is higher than that of the average rm without a DMM, across all but the last year, while for sales growth there are no systematic dierences between the two groups of rms.
We are also interested in the behavior of the rm's owners, and show the trading by rm insiders. Of particular interest is the exit by individual insiders. We measure insider trading by 7 There are some cases where the liquidity provider terminates its services, the most prominent being the Icelandic bank Kaupthing, which left the Norwegian equity markets as a result of the Icelandic Banking Crisis. However, most customers of Kaupthing either had already obtained another DMM provider before Kaupthing left the OSE, or just after. We don't view this as termination. 8 The rms are classied using the Global Industry Classication Standard (GICS), an industry taxonomy developed by MSCI and S&P. 9 We do not include data for 2004 in the table. The OSE rst allowed DMM agreements in October 2004. This means that the number of rms in the DMM group for 2004 is low (seven rms), and statistics for the DMM group would only measure the dierence for the last three months of 2004. Table 1 Describing DMM deals at the OSE The table in panel A describes the activity of DMMs at the OSE by listing the total number of rms on the exchange during the year, together with the number of new DMM deals and the number of active DMM deals. We also show the number of DMMs in four size quartiles, which are constructed by splitting the rms into four groups based on the total value of the equity in the rm at the previous year-end. Firms in size quartile 1 are the 25% smallest rms, and rms in size quartile 4 are the 25% largest rms. Panel B shows the distribution across the 10 GICS industries for the DMM-using rms. Global Industry Classication Standard (GICS) is an industry taxonomy developed by MSCI and S&P. Data for 2004{2012. counting the number of relatively large insider sales (N inside trades). The average number of insider trades does not reveal any systematic dierences between the two groups of rms. As a third set of statistics, we also look at the extent to which rms are active in the capital markets. To this end we show the fraction of rms that issue new equity or repurchase stocks in each year. With regard to repurchases we look at two denitions. First, we count the number of rms that have announced a repurchase plan. 10 We also count the number of rms that ex post actually conduct repurchases. For all these variables, there are some dierences between rms with DMMs and rms without a DMM (others), but there are few clear systematic patterns, the dierences are small, and the relative sizes may change across years.
Panel B of Table 2 shows the correlations between the variables. Note that these are contemporaneous correlations of annual aggregates. When we later study the determinants of the decision to hire a DMM, we need to be more careful about timing. With that qualication in mind, it is still important to note that many of the potential explanatory variables are correlated.
Liquidity and DMM choice
In the theory section, we discussed how a nancial intermediary (the supply side) would price its DMM services. We argued that the relevant input to this decision would be the current liquidity of the stock and the relative improvement in liquidity stipulated in the DMM contract.
Let us therefore look specically at liquidity dierences between rms with and without a DMM. The last set of statistics in Panel A of Table 2 shows statistics on some common measures of stock liquidity: Quoted and relative spreads, LOT (an estimate of transaction costs introduced by Lesmond et al. (1999) ) and ILR (the measure of price elasticity introduced by Amihud (2002) ). We also consider two liquidity measures providing information about the trading activity in a given stock. The rst activity measure is turnover, the fraction of a given stock's outstanding shares traded in a year. The second statistic is the number of trading days within a year in which a stock is traded. 11 Since the stocks that are considered for DMM services are among the less liquid at the OSE, they are not necessarily traded every day. To capture this property, we simply count the number of days that the stock is traded. To normalize this number, we relate the number of trading days to the number of potential trading days (business days), and measure the fraction of the trading year a given stock trades. Across all rms traded on the OSE, this average varies between 70% and 90%. At the OSE there is a set of internationally well known stocks (e.g. Statoil, Hydro and Telenor) traded actively, and certainly every day. Hence, this low number suggests that there is quite a number of stocks that trade infrequently.
We see some dierences in average liquidity across rms with and without a DMM, but these averages do not provide the pertinent information about how liquidity dierences aect the DMM hiring decision. A bottom line in the previous theory discussion was that we expect to see a nonlinear relation between current liquidity and the hiring of a DMM. The rms choosing to hire a DMM will not be the rms with very liquid or very illiquid stocks, but rather rms with medium liquidity. 12 We investigate this in more detail by looking at the cross-sectional frequency distributions of liquidity and DMM activity. In Figure 2 we show the distribution of relative spread and fraction of year traded for stocks that never hire a DMM (in Panels A and C), and stocks that at some point hire a DMM (in Panels B and D). The statistics for rms that hire a DMM (in Panels B and D) use observations before these rms hire a DMM. For the non-users we note that the distributions are highly skewed, concentrated towards good liquidity (low relative spread, high fraction of the year traded). For companies in the region with the best liquidity there is little need for a DMM. If a stock trades every day, with a very low average relative spread (e.g below 2%), it is unlikely that a rm would want to pay for a DMM to keep the spread much lower. We see that the distributions for rms that hire a DMM at some point later (in panel B and D) are less skewed, and that these rms on average are less liquid and have lower trading activity. For example, none of the rms in panel B have a relative spread lower than one percent before they hire a DMM, while in panel A we see that there is a large number of observations of relative spreads (for non-users) below this. Comparing the spread gures in Panel A (stocks without DMM) and Panel B (stocks that will hire DMM), we see that while the rms without a DMM are even more concentrated towards the very liquid stocks, there are still a number of rms that are very illiquid (high spreads, low fraction of the year traded), and that choose not to hire a DMM. Hence, the typical DMM stocks are neither the most liquid nor the least liquid ones. The gures show histograms of the distribution of two measures of stock liquidity, average annual relative spread and fraction of year traded. The panels shows empirical probability distributions for two groups of rms. The left-hand panels (A and C) only use the rms on the exchange that do not have a DMM. The basis for the gure is rm years and for each year we check whether the rm has had a DMM at some point during the year. If it has, this stock is in the group of DMM users and removed from the sample. In right-hand panels we instead only consider the rms which hire a DMM. For this sample we show the distribution of the liquidity using data for the one year period before the rm hired the DMM. We use the same x axis for the two pictures to make them more easily comparable. Data for 2004{2012. 3 What happens when a firm hires a DMM?
Distributions of Relative
In this section, we examine what happens to liquidity and trading activity in the secondary market for rms that hire a DMM. We look at measures of liquidity and activity in the period around hirings of DMMs. Given that the rm is paying for a liquidity improvement, we expect to see such an improvement. Figure 3 gives a visual illustration and shows histograms of the distribution of relative spread and fraction of year traded, one year before and one year after the start of the DMM contract. The two gures on the right (Panel B and D) show the frequency distributions of the liquidity measures for the year after the hiring of a DMM. Comparing this to the gures in panels A and B, which show the liquidity of the same rms in the year before the DMM hiring, we see that in both cases there is a clear shift towards improved liquidity. The spread distribution shifts towards zero, and the fraction of year traded shifts towards 1, after the DMM has been hired. While the change in spreads is what one would expect from the contractual terms, the increase in trading activity is interesting since it points to a positive externality associated with having a DMM.
To examine more formally how liquidity changes around DMM hirings, Table 3 shows the change in ve dierent liquidity and activity measures for a one-year and six-month period before and after the initiation of the DMM contract, with a test for whether the change is signicant. For the six-month period, we see that the relative spread, LOT and Amihud measures decrease signicantly after the DMM start. For the one-year window, the reduction in relative spread and the Amihud measure remain signicant, while the change in the LOT measure is rendered insignicant. Interestingly, turnover increases signicantly for the one-year horizon, and the fraction of the trading year with trades increases, both over the six-month and one-year horizon. This may indicate that the reduction in transaction costs due to the introduction of a DMM attracts new traders to the stock, causing trading activity to increase. 13 Table 3 Liquidity measures before and after DMM agreements We describe what happens after the market maker deals, by showing liquidity measures calculated using data for one year and six months before and after the market maker starts. In these calculations we only include stocks where we have observations for the whole period and leave out those cases where the DMM is hired at the same time that the stock is listed. The relative spread is the quoted spread divided by the quote midpoint. The LOT measure is the Lesmond et al. (1999) Another way to illustrate the dynamics is to look at this on a company-by-company basis, and illustrate the changes in liquidity due to the hiring or discontinuation of a DMM. In Figure 4 we illustrate time series of monthly average relative spreads for four selected rms. In each gure the time(s) where the rms have a DMM are marked by grey shaded areas. The four examples are chosen to illustrate dierent outcomes related to the hiring or termination of DMM arrangements. The rst two gures show that the presence of a DMM aects liquidity. The left gure in Panel A shows how the spread decreases after the hiring of a DMM in early 2010 (by the company Copenica). The second gure in Panel A shows the pattern for a company (IM Skaugen), which had two short periods without a DMM. It is evident from the gure that the spread jumps up when there is no DMM present, even for the event in the end of 2009 when the rm was without a DMM for just a few days. The last two gures, in panel B, are chosen to illustrate dierent outcomes when rms terminate a DMM service. The rst, Imarex, hired a DMM in 2007. At the end of 2011, the stock went from the most liquid index at the OSE (OB match) to the least liquid (OB Standard). Since stocks with DMM's are automatically included in the OB match, we know that the stock had no DMM after December of 2011. Liquidity gradually worsened during 2012, with an average relative spread going from about 2% to above 10% during the year. This suggest that the competitive spread was signicantly higher than the contractual DMM spread. In this case we have no information about why the DMM service was discontinued. However, given the huge increase in spread during 2012, we can speculate that the price that the DMM charged increased to reect lower trading interest in the stock, and that this price became higher than the company was willing to pay. The nal example is chosen to illustrate the opposite outcome at the termination of the DMM contract.
The company Bionor Pharma 14 ended its DMM agreement in 2012 without any apparent eect on the relative spread. When the DMM arrangement was terminated, the rm issued a press statement 15 which included the following formulation Bionor Pharma ASA has terminated the market making agreement with Sparebank1 Markets for the company`s shares. ... Bionor Pharma is one of the most actively traded stocks at the OSE related to its share capital. The Company expects this trend to continue going forward.
In other words, the company does not see any need to pay for DMM services, as the liquidity and activity is so high that the company's stocks will continue to be traded actively even without a DMM. The time series of the spread bears this presumption out, where the competitive spread remains at the same level as the DMM spread after the discontinuation of the DMM arrangement.
As the last two examples show, companies will sometimes end their DMM contracts. It is therefore interesting to look at how long they typically employ a DMM. In Figure 5 we describe Nutri Pharma / Bionor Pharma the empirical duration of the DMM contracts in the sample. As the gure shows, the use of a DMM is relatively long-term; only a small fraction of the companies employ a DMM for less than a year. To summarize, regarding the question of the eect of DMM initiations on liquidity, we see that there is an improvement in all liquidity measures around the DMM introduction, which is consistent with prior research on other markets. This is however a result which we should observe: the DMMs seem to do what they are paid to do, i.e. improve liquidity. The more interesting observation is that the DMM initiation is also associated with an increase in trading activity, as measured by fraction of trading days and turnover. Thus, there may be liquidity externalities associated with having a DMM in the sense that \liquidity attracts liquidity."
The corporate decision to hire a Designated Market Maker
Let us now turn to the main question of the paper; When do issuers choose to pay for a DMM? The hypothesis we want to test is whether rms that are about to eectuate capital market actions for which liquidity matters are more likely to hire a DMM to improve secondary market liquidity, a liquidity improvement which will improve the terms at which they can execute their corporate actions.
In our empirical specication, we look at calendar years. For each year we ask whether the rm hired a DMM within the year. We view this annual split into calendar years as natural since most of the corporate decisions we examine, such as exchange listing, repurchases and large capital issues, need approval from the annual meeting, which normally happens only once a year. We implement the actual analyses as a binomial choice model, using a Probit regression with the DMM hire as the dependent variable and measures related to capital market events as explanatory variables. 16 In the theory section we listed three corporate actions we want to investigate. These were Seasoned Equity Oering (SEO), Repurchases, and Listing (IPO). In our empirical design, we specify empirical proxies related to these three actions, and test whether they are important for the decision to hire a DMM. In the empirical analysis we use two approaches. The rst is an ex-ante approach, where we use only explanatory variables that are observable at the point when the decision to hire a DMM is made. The second approach is an ex-post analysis, where we look at what actions the rm makes after it has hired a DMM.
First, when constructing ex-ante proxies for SEOs, we take the view that the likelihood of an SEO increases with the capital needs of the rm. This motivates our use of proxies for capital needs as predictors for the likelihood of an SEO. More specically, as ex-ante proxies for capital needs we use two variables. The rst is the rm's growth opportunities, measured by Tobin's Q, where we assume that capital needs increase with growth opportunities. This implies that the probability of hiring a DMM increases with Q. As an alternative to Q, which has the problem that it may be open to other interpretations than growth potential, 17 we also consider recent growth in the sales of the rm. We assume that a rm that is currently experiencing high growth in sales is more likely to need more capital for investments further on.
An alternative to Q and growth opportunities is to look at the rm's actions ex-post. Do rms with a DMM actually perform an SEO after it has engaged a DMM? For this purpose we use a dummy for whether the rm issues equity at some point during the three years following the DMM hire. Secondly, we also construct proxies for corporate repurchasing of shares. Again, we apply two specications, one ex-ante and one ex-post. Our ex-ante measure is motivated by the regulation of how repurchases must be performed by Norwegian rms. Before a rm can repurchase shares, it must have approval from the annual meeting of shareholders to repurchase up to a given percentage (maximum 10%) of the rm's shares. This approval is valid for up to a maximum of fteen months and has to be renewed at the annual meeting. Our ex-ante measure of \planned" repurchases is whether, in the year we analyze, the rm has obtained approval for a repurchase program. 18 As our ex-post measure we use a dummy for whether the rm actually repurchases shares within three years after the DMM hire.
Thirdly, we construct proxies for IPOs. The rst proxy is a measure of the time since the rm became listed where we classify IPO rms as those having been listed for less than two years at a given point in time. A second proxy related to IPOs is the exit of the original owners. Among the motivations for IPOs, the desire for the original owners to lower their stake, for diversication or consumption purposes, is typically included. The original owners often have a holdup period before they can start divesting their stakes. Improved liquidity of the rm's shares would lower the price impact associated with insider sales after the expiry of the holdup. Most such cases would be registered as insider trades, which we have access to. We therefore use the number of insider trades in the period after the DMM initiation to measure such cases. To proxy for the exit decision by insiders, we count the number of large 19 sales by insiders. This is an ex-post measure. 20 There are, however, a number of additional factors that are likely to inuence whether a rm decides to hire a DMM. One is the current liquidity of its stock. If the stock is already liquid, there is little benet to be gained from hiring a DMM to improve liquidity. This feature of the data was discussed earlier and is illustrated by the histograms in Figure 2 , where we saw that for the rms traded every day, or with very low spreads, there were few DMM contracts. Intuitively, one would not expect very liquid and actively traded rms to be willing to pay a cost to improve liquidity in cases where the competitive spread is already very tight, as these rms would see little or no added benet from hiring a DMM. To account for this in our empirical specication, we exclude rms which already have very liquid stocks, and only consider those for which hiring a DMM is a relevant option. We choose to base the selection on the fraction of trading days that the stock is trading. If the rm, in the year before the one we are considering, traded on more than 90% of the days, we remove the rm from the sample.
In the following sub-sections, we show results from Probit estimations for the various specications discussed above. In subsection 4.1 we only look at the rst-time hiring of a DMM. Each year, we use the sample of rms on the OSE without DMMs, and ask why rms hire a DMM (for the rst time) during the year. In subsection 4.2, we look at the problem as an ongoing decision, and also include those rms already employing a DMM, asking when they want to continue using a DMM. Finally, in subsection 4.3, we look directly at the terminations of DMM arrangements.
First-time hires
We are interested in understanding the timing of the decision to hire a DMM for the rst time. Table 4 shows the estimation results for the sample containing only these rst-time hirings. When reporting the results from the various estimations, we group the explanatory variables into those available ex-ante (Q, planned repurchases, and listing age) and those only available ex-post (issuing equity, actual repurchases, and actual insider trades). The results are split into separate panels for the ex-ante and ex-post analysis. In each panel we present various specications, where each column contains the estimation results for one specication, with the most comprehensive specication rst. Note that across the various specications, the number of observations (rm years) will change. This is due to dierences in availability of some proxies, such as sales growth, for which we need accounting numbers over at least the two previous years. We choose to include the maximal number of observations in each Probit estimation.
In Panel A of Table 4 , we summarize the results from the ex-ante specications. Starting on the left, we have a specication with most of the possible explanatory variables, with the less comprehensive specications as we move to the right. Looking rst at the proxies related to future capital needs, Q, these are always positive and highly signicant. A positive coecient indicates that the probability of hiring a DMM increases with Q. Since Q is commonly used as a measure of growth opportunities, this is supportive of our hypothesis that rms that are more likely to need capital are those that hire a DMM. We also consider sales growth in the year of the DMM initiation. While the coecient on this proxy is also positive, it is not signicantly dierent from zero. There may be several reasons for this. First, the number of observations is much lower in this estimation, due to the need to have at least two years of sales history to calculate sales growth. Second, sales growth is a more noisy variable, since it is based on year-to-year accounts.
Let us next consider the alternative way of looking at capital needs, using ex-post data. These results are shown in Panel B of Table 4 . With respect to actual capital issuance, we see that the coecient is always positive and signicant. 21 The positive coecient supports our Table 4 Hiring a Designated Market Maker
The tables report the results from Probit regressions. The dependent variable in each regression is whether the rm hires a DMM in a given calendar year. Success in the Probit is hiring of a DMM. For each specication we show the coecient estimates and standard errors (in parenthesis). Signicance is indicated by stars. In the tables, each column gives results for a dierent Probit regression. The regressions are grouped into two panels where those in panel A only use explanatory variables that are observable at the time the DMM contract is announced. We call this the ex-ante specication. In panel B the explanatory variables include corporate events after the hiring of a DMM. We term this the ex-post specication. The \ex-ante" specication includes the following explanatory variables: Q { The current estimate of Q (market/book value of rm), Sales Growth { Growth in accounting income previous two years, Repurchase Program { Whether the rm has a repurchase program in place and Listed < 2 years { Dummy variable equal to one if it is 2 years or less since the rm was listed. For some of the accounting variables (Q and sales growth) we lose observations because the rm has not been listed long enough. In the sample we remove all rms with an already existing DMM contract. Also, we only consider rms that traded less than 90% of the available days the year before. The ex-post specication which includes the explanatory variables: Issue Equity -Dummy variable equal to one if the rm issues equity the next three years, Actual Repurchase -Dummy variable equal to one if the rm actually repurchases equity the next three years, Insider sales) -Number of cases with large insiders sales during the next three years. In both specications we also control for Liquidity (RelSpread) -The relative spread last year. In the sample we remove all rms with an already existing DMM contract. Also, we only consider rms that traded less than 90% of the available days the year before.
Panel A: "Ex-Ante" specification hypothesis that rms that hire a DMM are also more likely to raise additional equity capital in the following years, compared to the rms that do not employ a DMM. Hence, capital needs seems to be an important determinant in the decision to hire a DMM. For the case of stock repurchases, we see that the coecients are positive, indicating that repurchasing rms are more likely to hire a DMM. The signicance is however lower than for capital needs. In particular the ex-ante variable, that the rm has a repurchase program in place, is never a signicant determinant in the rst-time hiring decision. The results are more signicant for the ex-post variable, where we use actual repurchases. This can be due to the ex-ante variable being more noisy. A rm may want to get the annual meeting's approval of a repurchase program \just in case" since it is not committed to actually executing any repurchases. The actual repurchases are therefore a better proxy. Overall, we do nd supportive evidence that repurchases matter in the decision to hire a DMM.
Finally, we consider variables related to new listings. Here the ex-ante proxy, the age of the rm, is never signicant, although it is consistently positive. Similar to repurchases, the ex-ante proxy in this case is rougher than the ex-post one. Only using a rm's age has no information about the actual ownership structure at the rst listing. Here the actual ex-post insider sales should be a better indication. When we look at the results for this ex-post variable in Panel B, we nd that it is always positive and highly signicant in both specications.
Let us nally comment on the control variable, liquidity, measured as the relative bid/ask spread. Although it is only signicant in one out of three case, it is still useful to explain why the coecient on this is negative, implying that rms with higher spreads are less likely to hire a DMM. While this might seem counterintuitive, the reason is that we have removed the most liquid stocks from the sample. Therefore, the rms with relatively better liquidity in the truncated sample are those for which a DMM arrangement is a relevant option. The fee required by a DMM to be a market maker in the most illiquid rms would probably be prohibitive.
Robustness
The main result in the previous analysis suggested that the likelihood of corporate actions, such as capital issues and repurchases, is a determinant in the rst-time decision to hire a DMM. To verify the results of this analysis, we have performed additional robustness checks. One issue not addressed thus far is time variation. In particular, the fact that we have had a nancial crisis in the middle of the sample period may raise concerns about time variation potentially unrelated to the relationship of interest. We examine two alternative specications that aim at controlling for such time variation. The rst specication is meant to capture time variation in the dependent variable (hiring DMM) not directly related to the explanatory variables. We include xed annual eects to account for this. The results from this specication are shown in Table 5 . 22 The results show a clear eect of the nancial crisis. The dummy for 2009, the rst post-crisis year, is highly signicantly negative, which is due to a cutback in hiring of DMMs just after the crisis. Similar to all other stock markets the Norwegian market fell signicantly during 2009. However, for the Norwegian economy, the crisis was was not as deep and as long as that for the rest of Europe. This is shown by the lack of signicance in the dummy for the next year, 2010. However, the important result in this table is that the xed annual eects are not removing the signicance of the coecient on the variables Issuing Equity and Repurchase. Overall, the time variation in the interest of hiring DMMs do not aect our earlier conclusions.
Another concern ist that time variation may aect the explanatory variables, which will distort the estimated relationship between these variables and the choice of hiring a DMM. We have also estimated a specication that account for such eects by subtracting the crosssectional time series means of e.g. Q, and using this dierence as the explanatory variable. This Relative Q will then better identify the rms with high Q in a given cross-section. The results from these specications are included in an internet appendix, but including these alternative explanatory variables do not aect our conclusions.
Hiring and maintaining a DMM
As discussed earlier, the theory is silent about the dynamics of the DMM decision. If we believe that the rm is continuously evaluating whether to continue to pay for the DMM service, we should look into empirical specications that also let us evaluate this decision. We will now consider two such specications. In the rst we look at cases where a rm continues the DMM arrangement for one more period. We implement this by increasing the sample used in the previous Probit regressions, where we only looked at the rst hirings, to include continuations. So, in addition to the rms that do not hire a DMM, we now also include rms that had a DMM at the beginning of the year and redene the success in the Probit to be whether the rm maintains a DMM at the end of the year. The results from this analysis are summarized in Table 6 .
The results conrm the earlier results regarding capital issuance. Both the ex-ante (Q) and ex-post measures (Issue Equity) remain highly signicant. Regarding repurchases, the results are stronger than in the previous analysis. The ex-ante measure (repurchase program) is now also signicant in the specications where we do not include liquidity. This can be an indication that repurchases are a more important argument for keeping the DMM agreement going. Overall our earlier results are robust to this alternative specication. 23 22 To save space we only show the results for the ex-post specication. The ex-ante specication can be found in an Internet Appendix. 23 In an Internet Appendix we show robustness results for this specication, particularly specications robust to time variation. The table reports the results from Probit regressions with xed annual eects. The dependent variable in each regression is whether the rm hires a DMM in a given calendar year. Success in the Probit is hiring of a DMM. For each specication we show the coecient estimates and the number of rm-year observations. Each column gives results for a dierent Probit regression. The explanatory variables include corporate events after the hiring of a DMM. This \ex-post" specication includes the explanatory variables: Liquidity (RelSpread) -The relative spread last year, Issue Equity -Dummy variable equal to one if the rm issues equity the next three years, Actual Repurchase -Dummy variable equal to one if the rm actually repurchases equity the next three years, and Insider sales -Number of cases with large insiders sales during the next three years. We also include xed annual eects, shown by the variables 2007{2011. In the sample we remove all rms with an already existing DMM contract. Also, we only consider rms that traded less than 90% of the available days the year before. The \ex ante" specication include the following explanatory variables: Q { The current estimate of Q (market/book value of rm), Sales Growth { Growth in accounting income previous two years, Repurchase Program { Whether the rm has a repurchase program in place and Listed < 2 years { A dummy variable equal to one if it is 2 years or less since the rm was listed. For some of the accounting variables (Q and sales growth) we lose observations because the rms has not been listed long enough. We only consider rms that traded less than 90% of the available days the year before the DMM hire. The ex-post specication includes the explanatory variables: Issue Equity { Dummy variable equal to one if the rm issues equity the next three years, Actual Repurchase { Dummy variable equal to one if the rm actually repurchases equity the next three years, and Insider sales { Number of cases with large insider sales during the next three years. In both specications we also control for Liquidity (RelSpread) { The relative spread last year. In the sample we only consider rms that traded less than 90% of the available days the year before.
Panel A: "Ex-Ante" specification 
Discontinuations
Our nal approach to understanding rms' use of DMM arrangements is to study cases where rms discontinue their DMM contract. In this specication we change the explanatory variables slightly. The reason for this is that, while we still investigate equity issues and repurchases, we now want to look at the timing of the terminations of the DMM contracts. We therefore include variables that look at issuing activity and repurchase activity just before the decision to discontinue the DMM arrangement, as well as the ex-post variables used before. Take for example the stock issuance case. If a company has recently issued equity, it is less likely to need new capital in the near future. The potential benets of retaining a DMM may therefore be lower, leading to a discontinuation. We therefore include both equity issuance and repurchase activity before and after the decision to hire a DMM. The results are shown in Table 7 . One cautionary note is necessary here. The number of observations is much lower than in the previous analysis since we only use the sample of rms with a DMM at some point. If we rst look at the coecients on the equity issuance, there is a positive coecient on the \recently issued" variable, and negative coecient on the \will issue" variable. The interpretations of the signs are the following. A positive coecient means that it is more likely that a rm will discontinue the DMM service, and vice versa. These signs are what we would expect, since a recent equity issue means that the rm has less need for a liquid secondary market going forward. Conversely, if the rm has not issued yet, and will issue within the next few years, it is more likely to continue the DMM services. The signs of the variables are consistent with this explanation, but unfortunately none of these coecients are signicant. This may be due to the relatively few observations.
The results for repurchases, however, are much stronger. The coecient on future repurchase activity is highly signicant and negative, which suggests that if the rm is planning to repurchase shares going forward, they are less likely to terminate the DMM contract.
To summarize the main results of our empirical analysis of the decision to hire (or discontinue) a DMM, our results suggest that corporate hirings of DMM services occur when rms are planning to perform capital market actions such as a stock issuance (SEOs) and stock repurchases. The documentation of this link is the main contribution of our paper. Let us nally mention another interesting implication of our results, concerning the literature on repurchases. In our analysis we nd that rms planning to repurchase are more likely to hire a DMM. This is, however, inconsistent with the underpricing hypothesis aiming to explain why rms repurchase shares. The improved liquidity brought by the DMM will make under-valuation less likely. As argued by Bessembinder, Hao, and Lemmon (2011) , a restriction on spread widths by having a DMM encourages more traders to become informed, which speeds the rate at which market prices move toward true asset values. Hence, if under-valuation is the main reasons for why rms repurchase shares, it is less likely that the management would engage a DMM, since improving liquidity is likely to improve price discovery and reduce any mispricing. The table reports the results from Probit regressions. The dependent variable in each regression is whether the rm discontinues a DMM in a given calendar year. Success in the Probit is discontinuation of a DMM. The sample of rm and years only includes rms which currently have a DMM. For each specication we show the coecient estimates and the number of rm-year observations. In the tables, each column gives results for a dierent Probit regression. The explanatory variables are Liquidity (RelSpread) -The relative spread last year, Issued Equity Recently { Dummy variable equal to one if the rm has issued equity this and/or the previous two years, Repurchased Recently { Dummy variable equal to one if the rm has carried out repurchases this and/or the previous two years, Issue Equity Later { Dummy variable equal to one if the rm issues equity within the next three years, Repurchase Later { Dummy variable equal to one if the rm actually repurchases equity within the next three years, and Insider sales { Number of cases with large insiders sales within the next three years. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined when issuing rms decide to enter, retain or terminate a Designated Market Maker (DMM) arrangement. In the contracts we are studying, the DMM is paid directly by the issuer to improve secondary market liquidity in the rm's stock. The starting point of our analysis is that this cost needs to be oset by some benets at the corporate level.
The main hypothesis motivated and tested in the paper is that these benets are associated with improved terms in future corporate actions, such as equity issuance and stock repurchases. From a corporate nance view, the cost of having a DMM should be oset by the expected benets when the rm interacts with the capital market in the near future. The basic question in the paper rests on the theoretical insights by Bessembinder et al. (2012) , who show that rms in some cases can improve the terms in IPOs by paying a designated market maker to reduce the bid/ask spread below the competitive spread. While we also examine corporate actions other than IPOs, we assume that the basic mechanism and motivation for hiring a DMM is the same as in Bessembinder et al.
In our analysis, we examine three empirical specications. The rst considers only determinants in rst-time hirings of DMMs, the second case considers continuations of DMM arrangements, and the third case looks at the decision to terminate the DMM arrangement.
The contribution of our paper is to conrm our main hypothesis. Across various economietric specications, where we also perform a number of robustness exercises, we nd strong evidence that ex-ante measures relevant for the likelihood that the rm needs to access the capital markets in the near future are signicant determinants in rms' decisions to hire a DMM. While this result is consistent with earlier literature showing that secondary market liquidity is important for corporate nance decisions, our results suggest that rms themselves can improve the terms at which they e.g. raise capital by entering into a DMM contract before they interact with the capital markets.
We also make a contribution to the literature on stock repurchases by showing that rms planning to perform repurchases are more likely to hire a DMM to improve liquidity before they execute repurchases. This makes underpricing explanations for why rms initiate repurchases less likely, since the liquidity improvement will lower the probability that the stock is mispriced in the rst place. Explanations for repurchases are therefore more likely to involve rational theories, such as a cost-eective way of getting cash to a rm's owners.
